Since the beginning of recorded history, governments have provided humanitarian assistance during disasters due to natural hazards. The eruption of Mount Vesuvius on 24 August AD 79 destroyed the cities of Pompeii and Herculaneum. In response, the emperor of Rome established a relief fund to assist the displaced and widowed. 1 Today, disasters due to natural hazards are attended by an outpouring of humanitarian aid from both governmental and non-governmental agencies. The military, in particular, often is tasked with the initial governmental response, owing to its state of readiness.
In 2 Even though the MST was deployed and operational in less than 48 hours (one of the best-documented response times in the literature), they were unable to provide a single earthquake-related life-saving surgery. They did claim, however, to make a significant contribution to the evacuation effort and provided acute care augmentation to the overwhelmed local health services.
The conclusions made in this article support the findings of other emergency humanitarian relief agencies-that is, responding medical assets seldom respond rapidly enough to substantially contribute life-saving surgical needs. Either these needs will have been met through the intervention of local health services or the opportunity to intervene already will have expired. 3 Following the 2001 earthquake in Gujarat, India, Bremer reported that most surgical teams arrived too late to provide life-saving care. 4 In his review of 43 foreign field hospitals deployed following four recent disasters, von Schreeb et al found that none of the foreign field hospitals arrived early enough to provide emergency trauma care. 5 Even when surgical assets are available, they are utilized infrequently relative to non-surgical assets. In describing the aftermath of the 1999 earthquake in Turkey, Bar-Dayan et al noted that of the 2,230 patients treated at the Israeli Defense Forces field hospital over a nine-day period, 90% had non-traumatic illnesses. 6 Another Israeli Defense Force medical unit performed surgery <6% of the 1,200 patients they treated following the same earthquake. 7 During a sudden-onset disaster, rapid response teams intending to provide medical care should be capable of providing sufficient support to enable local medical facilities to re-establish adequate services. To achieve this goal, rapid response teams should configure away from a surgical capability in favor of a multi-disciplinary medical capability, and as appropriate, facilitate rapid evacuation for those who may benefit. The latter point potentially is significant in that the rapid evacuation of critically ill patients to higher levels of care lessens the burden of local medical facilities and frees up critically needed bed space. 8 For example, following an earthquake, urgent hemodialysis to treat crush syndrome may be important to arrange. 9 
Editorial Comments
Even if a suitably sized and configured medical unit is selected from the current military inventory, there will be inevitable mismatches between the needs of the disasterstricken population and the battle-focused design of military units. Spinella et al showed that deployed military medical facilities could not adequately manage the large number of pediatric patients received. 13 Similar lessons have been learned and shared by other military organizations. 14 Until recently, it was unreasonable to expect the US military to configure medical assets for a primary humanitarian disaster missions first and combat and defense missions second. 15 With a renewed emphasis on homeland security and domestic response, it is conceivable future medical units may be designed with disaster response in mind. 16 The success of any disaster rapid-response team ultimately depends on its ability to adapt to the acute needs of the local population, assist in re-establishing local medical services, and facilitating medical evacuation, logistics, consultation, and communication. Military units often are the best option for nations willing to help, but a more nuanced approach can be of even greater benefit. Since rushing in to provide emergency surgery does not seem to be helpful, for now, a more capable and flexible response, even if slightly slower, may be better. In the future, as the US and other militaries develop and refine their primary disaster response capabilities, an appropriately rapid and tailored response may be possible.
Ideally, the rapid-response team is a flexible, self-sufficient, and rapidly mobile unit capable of meeting the needs of a wide variety of disaster and humanitarian response missions. The current inventory of US military medical units is limited in this regard. The MST described by Malish et al is a modified Forward Surgical Team (FST), which is quite mobile, but of course, is designed for resuscitative surgery of battle casualties and little more. 10 Navy Shock-Trauma Platoons (STPs) and Air Force Small Expeditionary Aeromedical Rapid Response (SPEARR) Teams also are highly mobile, and both offer more flexible designs and broader mission capability than the surgically focused FSTs. 11, 12 Army Medical Companies are larger units and come in a variety of forms, and all offer ambulatory care capabilities, initial non-surgical resuscitation, limited ward care, and are equipped for basic laboratory, plain radiography, and ground ambulance evacuation. 10 They are fully mobile but considerably larger and heavier than FSTs, STPs, and SPEARRs. Given the scale of many disasters, the larger footprint may be an advantage (assuming a larger unit can be transported to the scene in the first place). The most capable medical unit, the Combat Support Hospital is simply too large to expect a rapid response. Of note, similar units to those described exist in the other US uniformed services and the militaries of many nations.
